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I.
LIST OF ALL PARTIES
1.

Kristi Pace, Appellant, is an individual, and the surviving spouse of the decedent,
William Matthew Pace.

2.

The Estate of William Matthew Pace, Appellant, is all individuals or entities that
may have an interest at law or in equity in the remaining assets and obligations of
the decedent William Matthew Pace.

3.

St. George City Police Department, Appellee, is a governmental agency operating
under the City of St. George.

4.

The City of St. George, Appellee, is a governmental entity, and is an incorporated
city within the State of Utah.
II.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-

2(4) and § 78-2a-3G).
III.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Appellant asserts that the service of the Notice of Claim by prior counsel for the
Appellant was proper pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
1953 §63-30d-401.

As such, Plaintiffs/Appellants maintain that the Trial Court

improperly dismissed this suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs/Appellants assert that the governmental entities waived their sovereign
immunity, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (2003), and that the sovereign
immunity of the State was not maintained due to an alleged "incarceration" of the
decedent at the time of the incident.
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented are reviewed for correctness without any deference to the
trial court's determination of law. Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 69 P.3d 1287, 474 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT 25 (Utah, 2003).
V.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 63-30d-401.

2.

Utah Code Ann. 1953, § 63-30-11.

3.

Utah Code Ann. 1953, § 63-30-10.

4.

Utah Code Ann. 1953, 63-30-11.

5.

Utah Code Ann. 1953, 78-2a-1.

6.

Constitution. Article 8, § 1; Utah Code Ann. 1953,78-2a-1.

7.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6).

2

VI.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The Utah Legislative changes to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act went into
effect July 1,2004.
Plaintiffs/Appellants9 Notice of Claim was filed July 2, 2004, upon "City of St.
George, 175 East 200 North, St. George, Utah 84770," by Plaintiffs/Appellants' prior
counsel, Braunberger, Boud & Draper, P.C. There was no "City Clerk" within the City
of St. George that could be served. The City Recorder is Gay Cragun, who works for the
City of St. George located at the same address.
Suit was filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, and service
of the Summons and Complaint was effectuated March 4th, 2005, and was served upon
Gay Cragun at the same address listed above.
Defendants/Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss July 11th, 2005, alleging improper
filing of the Notice of Claim by Plaintiffs/Appellants' prior counsel, Braunberger, Boud
& Draper, P.C. After the filing of several responsive memorandum by both sides, the
Court issued the Defendants/Appellees' Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice of the
Plaintiffs/Appellants' lawsuit on January 18, 2006. The Defendants/Appellees5 grounds
for dismissal were (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to an improper filing of the
Notice of Claim, and (2) because the governmental entities had not waived their
sovereign immunity surrounding actions with regard to the "incarceration" of William
Matthew Pace.
3

From this order, Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully appeal.
VII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Matthew Pace was arrested March 13, 2004 for theft. William Matthew
Pace was wearing a prosthetic back brace at the time of his arrest and was searched by
the arresting officers. Such search failed to produce the 9mm pistol that Mr. Pace had, on
his person, underneath the back brace. While in custody, prior to the filing of any formal
charges, and before interrogations were completed, William Matthew Pace was excused
to use the restroom and his restraints were removed. While in the restroom, William
Matthew Pace produced the 9mm pistol and fatally shot himself.

vm
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The St. George Defendants' statement of the issues attempts unduly to broaden
them so as to dilute the attention that each assigned error merits. A Motion to Dismiss
requires a careful examination of the underlying facts and law. As shown in Plaintiffs'
opening brief and below, service of the Notice of Claim was effective, and thus the
District Court erroneouly dismissed the case. Moreover, the St George Defendants do
not merit governmental immunity under the particular facts of this case and the law.
Consequently, there will be matters to litigate as genuine issues of law and fact when this
Court sets aside the dismissal of the action and remands the case for proceedings on the
merits. This Court reviews for errors of law and, consequently, need not defer to the
4

decision of the District Court below. Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 69 P.3d 1287, 2003 UT
25.
IX.
ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiff Met the Requirement of Utah Statutes Concerning Service of Notice
Of Claim
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA) provides that a claim against a

governmental entity must be filed by giving notice within one year after the claim arises
regardless of whether the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (repealed July 2004 and replaced with Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(2) which does not differ appreciably from the previous statute).
Assuming that the repealed statute controls the Plaintiffs' substantive rights; the new
statute provides the procedure Plaintiffs could have followed for effecting a Notice of
Claim.
The procedure in the new statute for Notice of Claim provides that "[e]ach
governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file a statement with the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce
containing: (i) the name and address of the governmental entity; (ii) the office or agent
designated to receive a notice of claim; and (iii) the address at which it is to be directed
and delivered." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(5)(a). The City of St. George did just
that.

See Appellee's Brief, Addendum "Certified Copy for St. George" and

accompanying page (asserting compliance with sub (a) above).
5

The new statute further provides that "the notice of claim shall be * * * directed
and delivered by hand or mail * * * to the office of: the city or town clerk, when the
claim is against an incorporated city or town, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(A);
* * * or the agent authorized by a governmental agency to receive the Notice of Claim by
the governmental entity under subsection 5(e)1." Id. at (G). The Defendants' reason that
because Plaintiffs did not "serve" the "town clerk" under sub (A) that Plaintiffs' Notice
of Claim is deficient and therefore did not "strictly comply" with the statute. However,
Plaintiffs' served the City of St. George's designated agent under sub (G), thus affecting
a valid Notice of Claim. The District Court failed to account for the authorized agent
provision under sub (G) and (5)(e), and thus erred in dismissing the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Case law casts some light on the purpose and the interpretation of the statute. For
example, several cases concerning full compliance with the Notice of Claim provisions
have dealt with filing a Notice of Claim with the governing body of the political
subdivision within one year after the claim arises.

See, e.g., Busch v. Salt Lake

International Airport, 921 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah 1996); Scarborough v. Granite School
District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975). Thus, cases in which the plaintiff sent Notice of
Claim to a claim adjuster, even perhaps at the claim adjuster's suggestion, have not
1

"A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent authorized by the entity to
accept notice of claim on its behalf." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(5)(e). The City of St.
George did so by identifying Gay Cragun in the statement to the Utah Department of Commerce
Division of Corporations & Commercial Code mentioned above ("Certified Copy" in Appellee's
Brief). Plaintiffs directed and delivered Notice of Claim to Gay Cragun. See Affidavit of Jason
Neal, attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, July 26,2005.
6

constituted adequate service. See. e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 37 P.3d 1156
(Utah 2001) (plaintiff did not deliver the notice to the president or secretary of the UTA
Board); Brown v. Utah Transit Authority, 40 P.3d 638 (Utah 2002) (improperly mailed
notice to an employee of UTA's risk department); Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632
(Utah 2002) (filed with commissioners rather than clerk). Wheeler dealt with a case in
which the county argued that Plaintiffs Notice of Claim was insufficient because
Plaintiff had served it on the Cain County Commissioners rather than upon the Cain
County Clerk. 40 P.3d at 634. There, however, the Plaintiff did not provide notice to the
county clerk and the court concluded that actual notice did not absolve a party of its duty
to comply strictly with the Act. Id. at 637. Those cases are distinguishable from the case
at bar because those Plaintiffs did not follow the statute; whereas, Plaintiffs in this case
did.
In interpreting a statute, the primary focus necessarily is upon the intention of the
legislature. Any proposed interpretation of the statute must be compatible with its
purpose and objective. Wills v. Heber Valley Hist. Railroad Authority, 79 P.3d 934, 936
(Utah 2003) (citing O'Keefe v. Utah State Ret. Bd, 956 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 1998)).
Consequently, the purpose and intent of the legislature must guide a decision concerning
"strict compliance with the notice provisions" of the Act. Thus, attempts to avoid the
effectiveness of a Notice of Claim by the argument that the notice was delivered at the
"wrong" address of two addresses for the Utah Attorney General were unavailing. See
Wills, 79 P.3d at 936; see also Brown v. Utah Transit Authority, 40 P.3d 638, 639 (Utah
7

2002). Looking to the purpose and intent of the governmental immunity act, the Utah
Supreme Court noted that the purpose is to "afford the responsible public authorities an
opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of public
revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation." Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d
480, 482 (Utah 1980). When Plaintiffs in the case at bar served Notice of Claim on Gay
Cragun, they did all they could to effectuate valid notice under the statute.
Defendant St. George's argument focuses on alleged failure to direct the Notice of
Claim to the city recorder, Gay Cragun. Appellee's Brief at 13-16. That argument
overlooks the actual service on Gay Cragun which Plaintiffs' attorney accomplished on
March 3, 2005 pursuant to their inquiry with the St. George City offices. See Exhibit A
of Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, attached as Appendix 1 to this brief. See also, the affidavit of Jason Neal,
attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, attached as Appendix 2 to this brief. That affidavit notes that Gay Cragun
inquired as to why she was being served a duplicate set of documents before she accepted
them. (Items 23 and 25.) Thus, those exhibits prove that, among other things, Gay
Cragun was originally served with a Notice of Claim pursuant to statute by Plaintiffs'
prior counsel. Although Gay Cragun's name does not appear on the Notice of Claim,
Plaintiffs directed and delivered the Notice of Claim to Gay Cragun in her official
capacity as authorized agent at the address listed on the original Notice of Claim.
8

Consequently, this is not a case involving a service of notice which involves a
Plaintiff giving no notice. See, e.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah 1983).
Nor is it a case in which the Plaintiff filed only one of the two required notices such as in
Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Trans., 728 P.2d 535, 541 (Utah App. 1992). This also is
not a case in which the Notice of Claim was defective in form or content such as in Cox
v. Utah Mortgage and Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1986) (letter did not assert a
claim for damages), or in which the Notice of Claim was not filed within one year. See,
e.g., Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1985) (per curiam).
As a further example, in Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 276 (Utah App. 1995)
the county sought to dismiss because the Plaintiffs Notice of Claim was addressed to an
attorney at the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office rather than to the county commission.
In that case, looking to the primary purpose of the statute, the court found that proper
Notice of Claim was accomplished "because Bischel directed and delivered her notice
precisely as instructed by the statute and the County Commission ****." Id. at 279. In
the case at bar, Plaintiffs served more than just the authorized agent Gay Cragun as
directed by the city; Plaintiffs also served Notice of Claim on the governmental entity and
governing board. It is inconsistent at best for the city to instruct Plaintiffs to serve Gay
Cragun and then argue Notice of Claim was inadequate because Plaintiff did as directed.
Id. Service of the Notice of Claim was sufficient and the District Court erroneously
dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint.
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II.

The St. George Defendants are Not Immune from Suit Under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

The St. George Defendants assert that they are immune from suit under the
doctrine of Sovereign Immunity because it is retained when a suit is for negligently
causing injury arising out of the incarceration of any person. Utah Code Ann. § 63-3010(10). However, Plaintiff William Pace had not been incarcerated for purposes of the
immunity discussed in the Madsen case. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978)
(plaintiff injured during surgery while an inmate). Instead, Plaintiff was under arrest but
not subject to post-sentencing confinement. As such, the government does not enjoy
blanket immunity for its actions.
Governmental immunity traditionally lies when the government is engaged in
policy-making decisions (discretionary), not when the government's actions deal with the
ministerial duties of carrying out policy. See e.g., Sandberg v. Layman, Jensen and
Donahue, L.C., 76 P.3d 699 (Utah App. 2003). In this case, the police had arrested
Plaintiff and he was under questioning and investigation, but he had not yet appeared in
court and had not yet been sentenced. In carrying out the ministerial functions of arrest
and investigation, the police necessarily must act with care, not only to protect
themselves and the public but to protect those in their custody. Thus, this case is
distinctly different from those in which incarceration is involved following arrest or
sentencing or commitment to a state mental hospital because, in those instances, the
searches conducted must necessarily be adequate to insure the safety of the confined
individual, or others confined, and of their custodians. Thus, Emery v. State, 483 P.2d
10

1296 (Utah 1971) is not on point. Mere confinement does not relieve the government of
the duty to insure, at a reasonable level, the safety of those it confines.
III.

The Concept of Governmental Immunity Does Not Exonerate the
Government from Suit Under the Facts of This Case.

St. George Defendants urge that, as an additional ground for affirming the District
Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah and
the Utah Governmental Immunities Act provide that governmental entities and their
employees are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a
"governmental function." Appellee's Brief at 19-20 citing Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1)
and 63-30(d)-201(l). Relying on the statute that states that immunity is not waived for
injuries caused as a result of "making an inadequate or negligent inspection," St. George
Defendant urges that the St. George Defendants' are immune from suit. Appellee's Brief
at 20. This is because St. George Defendants insist that the St. George Defendants did
not owe a duty to Plaintiff.
However, St. George Defendants' argument is flawed in significant ways. When
the government acts, it is not invariably acting in an "governmental function" that enjoys
immunity. Instead, consistent with the concept of immunity for only discretionary or
policy decisions, the term "governmental function" imports the concept of actions
reflecting policy decisions only government can make. Beyond those, as the enactment
of the governmental immunity act generally recognizes, sovereign immunity does not
operate and the government may be liable for negligence in failing to carry out its various
functions in a reasonable or safe fashion. See generally Condemarin v. University Hosp.,
11

775 P.2d 348, 349-51 (Utah 1989) (citing Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230 (Utah 1980) and Brittain v. State ex rel Utah Dept. of Employment SEC, 882 P.2d
666, 669-70 (Utah App. 1994). The negligent search in this case did not represent a
policy decision meriting governmental immunity but rather negligence of a ministerial
type subjecting the St. George Defendants to suit.
St. George Defendants also urge that because there was no allegation that the
arresting officers were aware of any suicidal potential that Plaintiff, William Pace,
personally presented, the general rule that law enforcement officers owe a duty to the
public as a whole, not to an individual, controls. However, duty imports the concept of
reasonableness in dealing with the public. Consequently, officers claiming that they were
unfamiliar with the specific tendency of the decedent is not an excuse. Instead, the risk to
individuals acting against their interest while in confinement is sufficiently widespread
that reasonable law enforcement procedures would encompass this possibility, requiring a
more thorough search not only to protect the person subject to custody but the general
public as a whole. The Kansas case Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 536
P.2d 54, 63-64 (Kansas 1975) is not controlling, particularly because it dealt with the
potential liability of an individual police officer, rather than the city generally.
Moreover, even if people are inherently less controllable than physical things, a
certain kind of relationship exists when those with authority place another individual in
their custody. When a person exerts control over another and confines them so that they
do not have control over their liberty, they are not able to fend for themselves. They
12

become dependent upon their custodians. Because of the individual nature of different
people, reasonable police practices would encompass contemplating the prospect of a
subject's suicide or the prospect of a subject harming others and reasonable procedures
would require taking steps to prevent such harm. Thus, the question is not whether the
arresting officers knew Plaintiff, William Pace, to be uniquely dangerous to himself, but
rather whether a reasonable police officer, operating consistently with reasonable police
practices, would have conducted a careful search to prevent harm to the person confined,
to the police officers and to others in the public generally. Higgins v. Salt Lake County,
855 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1993) thus does not control. In Higgins, a special relationship
and consequential duty may have existed when the Defendant knew of the potential
danger an individual who was released from mental health ward might have posed to
others. 855 P.2d 240. Thus, granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was error. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that the Governmental Immunity Act
barred an action for a stabbing because of a specific provision of that act. However, that
section does not apply here as there was no assault or battery of a third person. Thus,
Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action and the District Court erroneously dismissed the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The claim has merit which a fact-finder
must consider under Utah law.

13

X.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in Plaintiffs/Appellants' opening brief and this reply brief,
this Court should reverse the District Court's dismissal and remand the case back to the
District Court for trial on the merits.
DATED this 5th day of September 2006.
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES

MarkrtrTjraff,Attorney for Plain^ffs/A^peUa
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Jennifer Taylor, Legal Assistant, hereby certify that on the 5th day of September
2006, I caused to be mailed, U.S. first-class postage prepaid, true and correct copies of
the above and foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief, to the following:
JESSE C. TRENTADUE
SUITTERAXLAND
Attorneys for Appellee, St. George Police Dept.
8 East Broadway, #200
P.O. Box 510506
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
SHAWN M. GUZMAN
ST. GEORGE CITY ATTORNEY
Attorneys for Appellee, St. George City
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit A of Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Affidavit of Jason Neal, Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
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BRAUNBERGER,

BOUD & DRAPER, P.C.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Wayne H. Braunberger
James R. Boud
Tad D. Draper
Troy K. Walker

765 East 9000 South, Suite A-l
Sandy, Utah 84094
Phone (801) 562-3200
Fax (801) 562-5250
NOTICE OF CLAIM
July 2,2004

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND REGULAR MAIL
St. George Police Department
200 East 265 North
St. George, Utah 84770
City of St. George
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
Mayor Daniel McArthur
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
City Council Member - Suzanne Allen
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
City Council Member- Larry Gardner
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
City Council Member- Rodney Orton
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
City Council Member- Robert Whatcott
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
Re:

Our Client:

Kristy Pace, widow to Matthew Pace
1

Of Counsel
Richard I. Ashton
[Inactive]

Date of Incident:

March 13, 2004

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This letter shall serve as Notice of Claim upon the City of St. George pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et. seq. Further, governmental immunity is deemed waived in this matter.

SECTION I
Statement of Facts
On March 13, 2004, an officer at the St. George Police Department, believed to be
Officer Collard arranged for Matthew Pace to come into the police department for an interview
regarding an alleged theft. At the time of the interrogation, the police department performed a
pat down search on Matt Pace to check for weapons and presumably other potentially dangerous
objects. It is also believed that Mr. Pace again underwent a second pat down search while in
police custody. Subsequent to these searches, Mr. Pace asked to use the restroom. Accordingly,
two St. George police officers escorted Mr. Pace to the restroom and stood, in presence,
approximately 12 feet away while he was in the restroom facilities. At this time, he pulled a
hand gun from his belt region and shot himself in the head. Mr. Pace died immediately. Mr.
Pace was not searched with a magnetometer.
SECTION II
Nature of the Claim
This claim is against the City of St. George, and more particularly the St. George Police
Department for the wrongful death of William Matthew Pace, who, while under worry and duress
while being in police custody, was not properly searched either manually, or through the use of a
magnetometer for a dangerous weapon. The negligence of improperly searching and securing the
safety of Mr. Pace directly resulted in his death, and the endangerment of other individuals in the
police facility. The claim is brought by and through Kristy Pace, Mr. Pace's wife, and personal
representative to his estate, both in her individual and personal representative capacity. The
claim is asserted under one or more of the provisions of Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
SECTION III
Injuries and Damages Sustained
The injuries are, loss of support, companionship, society and other losses and injuries
pertaining to a wrongful death action on behalf of Kristy Pace and the heirs of Matthew Pace.
The compensable loss and damages resulting from the wrongful acts of the St. George Police
Department include, but are not limited to the necessary and reasonable cost and loss associated
with Mr. Pace's wrongful death, including funeral expenses and the economic loss, both present
and future. The full value of this has not currently been determined, but would include a

2

calculation for present and future wage loss as well as general damages for pain, suffering, loss
of society and companionship, which is not currently known, but will be established upon further
discovery and investigation.
SECTION IV
Acknowledgment
This Notice of Claim is intended to comply with the provisions set forth in Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-12 et seq. The undersigned is a duly authorized attorney of the Claimants by
written agreement.
DATED this

<£

day of

_, 2004

fad D. Draper
Attorney for Plaintiff
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